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Abstract* 
 
This paper explores the link between what people say they prefer to do and 
what they actually do. Using data from an experimental project explored 
trust and pro-sociality for representative samples of individuals in six Latin 
American capital cities, the paper links the results of these experiments with 
the responses obtained from representative surveys to the same participating 
individuals. Individuals with higher agreement with a set of pro-social 
statements are those more willing to contribute and collaborate to the social 
welfare in the community, and what people say is linked to what people do. 
This supports the idea that the inclusion of subjective controls in the left-
hand-side in an empirical specification does carry useful information. 
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1. Introduction 
 
While economic experiments have become widely accepted in the profession, it is unclear 
how closely their findings correspond with the responses that individuals provide in 
surveys, arguably, the most prominent tool for traditional empirical analysis.
1 In this paper 
we study the link between what individuals say and what individuals do by comparing their 
stated preferences regarding pro-sociality as well as their involvement in social 
organizations, and their corresponding actions when exposed to laboratory experiments on 
those same issues. The key question we want to address is whether such stated preferences 
and revealed actions may be viewed as complements rather than substitutes. Interestingly, 
as straightforward as this issue is, to our knowledge it has not yet been broached in the 
economics literature.  Typically, the experimental literature has placed great emphasis on 
design, but less so on sampling issues. On the other hand, household surveys as well as 
individual surveys that measure attitudes and preferences have placed great emphasis on 
sample representation, but both measurements are regarded as somewhat flawed, 
particularly those of preferences, as the credibility of the average responses to the questions 
posed are frequently put in doubt.   
In this paper, not only do we employ representative samples for six cities in Latin 
America, but also have the participating individuals respond a survey on attitudes directly 
related to the experiments undertaken that thus allow us to test how experiments and 
surveys fare together. Since the main objective is to assess how both techniques compare in 
representative samples, we focus on well-known, “tried and true” laboratory experiments 
where protocols and overall findings appear to be well established. In particular, we applied 
a simple trust game, a voluntary contribution game and a risk sharing game. Additionally, to 
explore attitudes towards uncertain outcomes of the participating individuals, we measured 
individual aversion to risk, ambiguity and losses.  
                                                       
1 In psychology, Todd et al. (2007) study mismatches between stated preferences and actual choices regarding 
mates. Neill et al. (1994) found, within an experimental setup, that open-ended hypothetical surveys fail to 
capture the elicitation of real economic commitments from individuals. To our knowledge, the only attempt to 
link results from economic experiments to responses to surveys is Burks, Carpenter and Verhoogen (2003) 
which explore the links between a measure of Machiavellian behavior and trust and trustworthiness of a 
sample of college students, playing both roles in the trust game.   5
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the sample and the 
experimental design. Section 3 describes the methodological approach to measure the link 
between what people say and what people do. Section 4 presents our main findings. Section 
5 provides additional findings based on the robustness of our variable of interest. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Sample and Experimental Design 
 
The full sample consists of more than 3,000 individuals from all backgrounds, socio-
economic levels, age cohorts, and both sexes, from the following six Latin American capital 
cities: Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo and San Jose. Not only do we 
believe that this is the most comprehensive experimental dataset to date in Latin America, 
but also a particularly unique one since the samples are representative at the city level. In 
particular, the data collected combine detailed socio-economic and demographic 
background with behavioral information.  
To carry out the field work we conducted sessions of an average of 20 people 
recruited in the streets and brought to a university campus room. Each experimental session 
followed the exact same protocol, with the exact same sequence of activities as a team of 
researchers with experience in survey and field methods was selected to undertake the 
sample design and conduct the experiments and surveys in each city. In order to guarantee 
homogeneity in the application of experimental protocols they participated in a training 
workshop at the launching of this project in Bogotá during the first quarter in 2007. This 
workshop provided a uniform approach to implementation and related fieldwork details 
such as sampling procedures, writing style and jargon in the Spanish protocol, timing of 
actions (i.e., invitations, pre-survey, experiments, post-surveys), elements to be included in 
experimental sessions and the construction of questionnaires. Details are provided in a 
related technical paper (Candelo et al., 2007). 
The samples were selected using a stratified random sampling applied at the city 
level. The strata were chosen on the basis of education, average family income of the 
districts or the territorial units that make up each city (in either quartiles or quintiles,   6
depending on data availability), gender and age.
2 The goal of the sampling procedure was to 
obtain empirical distributions of individuals within these combinations of characteristics 
resembling those of the populations in the cities. With the sampling quotas defined, the first 
step of the fieldwork consisted of inviting individuals to experimental sessions. The 
sessions were arranged so that at least three sessions per city included only individuals from 
high-income strata and at least three other sessions included only individuals from low-
income strata; the rest combined individuals from all strata. Around 30 individuals were 
invited for each session, under the assumption that approximately one third would not show 
up to the session, but allowing each experimental session to go forward with roughly 20 to 
25 participants, each lasting between two and three hours.
3 
As one of the main goals of the study is to observe the effect of social heterogeneity 
on individuals’ decisions, information on the socio-economic composition of the groups in 
each particular session was made as salient and clear as possible. The participants met 
throughout the session in one room where they were able to see each other, although they 
were not allowed to communicate during the session. During the recruitment process we 
avoided having two people who knew each other within one session. As the sessions 
progressed, participants received information about their peers, depending on the particular 
activity (Candelo et al., 2007).
4 In each of the sessions participants made decisions during 
four activities regarding trust, public goods voluntary contributions, risk attitudes and risk 
sharing.  
The first activity applied was a Trust Game, using the strategy method. As it is well 
known, in this game session participants are randomly assigned in pairs: half assume the 
                                                       
2 The age groups employed were the following: (i) 17-27; (ii) 28-38; (iii) 39-59 and (iv) 60-72. 
3 Potential participants were invited several days before the scheduled sessions and were promised, on top of 
the potential experimental gains, a show-up fee. The day before each experimental session they were reminded 
of the invitation with a phone call or home visit; transportation was arranged or paid for in advance, if 
necessary. The day of the sessions the participants were welcomed by teams in each city and at the accorded 
time sessions started. Following the batteries of experiments, participants completed the survey. To reduce 
idiosyncratic measurement error due to individuals’ reading ability, the surveys were administered by the 
coordinators of the experiments and supported by a group of pollsters especially trained for these purposes. 
After participants completed the surveys, the payoffs from the experiments were computed and the 
participants received their payments (Candelo et al. (2007). 
4 The experiments are based on now widely tested designs by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), Binswanger 
(1980), Holt and Laury (2002), Barr (2003), Marwell and Ames (1979), Isaac and Walker (1988), and 
adaptations to field experiments discussed or reported in Carpenter, Harrison and List (2005), Harrison and 
List (2004), Cárdenas (2003), and Cárdenas and Carpenter (2008).   7
role of player 1 and the other half, that of player 2. Both groups are simultaneously located 
in different rooms, and identities of the pairs are never revealed, although each player 
receives information on key demographic characteristics of their pairs (sex, age, schooling 
level and socio-economic stratum). Both players receive an equal endowment, and player 1 
is then asked to decide how much of this endowment he or she wants to send to player 2, 
knowing that player 2 will then receive three times that amount on top of the initial 
endowment everyone initially receives. In another room, player 2 is asked to decide the 
amount to be returned to player 1 for each possible offer from player 1, from a discrete set 
of fractions of amounts sent (0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%). Immediately before making 
their decisions, individuals are also asked to predict the decisions to be made by the other 
player. That is, the amount expected by player 2 from player 1, and player 1’s expected 
returned amount from player 2. After both players make their decisions the matching of the 
choices is made. Replications of this game around the world have shown that people on 
average send half of the initial endowment to player 2, and that the returns from player 2 to 
player 1 generate a net positive return for player 1 of about ten to twenty percent from what 
was originally sent (Cárdenas and Carpenter, 2008; Ashraf, Camerer and Loewenstein,   
2007).  
The second activity pursued was a one-shot dichotomous Voluntary Contributions 
Game, adapted from the larger Voluntary Contributions Model designs in the literature 
(Ledyard, 1995), in which all participants in the session are gathered in a single room and 
each player is given one token that can be invested in an individual or a group account. The 
player that keeps the token in a private account earns an amount, for example 10 dollars, as 
well as one dollar for each participant that invests her token in the group account. On the 
other hand, if the player invests the token in the group project, her token as well as the rest 
of tokens in the group account yield a return of one dollar for every participant in the group. 
Given a group of 20 people, we would have a Marginal Per Capita Return Ratio (MPCR) of 
0.10 and a classical case of a social or cooperation dilemma where the Nash strategy would 
be to keep the token but the social optimum would be achieved if everybody invested their 
tokens in the group account. Before they make their individual and private decisions to 
contribute or not to the group, the coordinator announces both verbally and on a board the   8
composition of the group, namely, the number of participants, the number of men and 
women, the number of people in each educational level, and in each socio-economic strata. 
The coordinator also requests that every participant write her prediction of the number of 
cooperators, as none of them knows in advance whether each individual would contribute or 
not.  
The third activity was based on the Risk Game first used in India by Binswanger 
(1980) and later used by Barr (2003), in which each player makes individual decisions over 
three games that measure individual attitudes over risk, ambiguity, and losses. The first 
stage within this activity offers the participants a set of outcomes for six 50/50 lotteries that 
go from a sure low payoff to an all-or-nothing higher expected payoff. The lotteries in 
between gradually increase both in expected value and in the spread between the low and 
high payoff. The second stage offers the same payoffs for the six lotteries just mentioned. 
However, unlike in the first stage, individuals do not know the exact probabilities, but are 
informed that at least 30 percent of the chances correspond to the low payoff and at least 30 
percent of the changes correspond to the high payoff.  The third stage also uses six lotteries 
with 50/50 probabilities but includes the possibility of negative payoffs in some cases.
5  
Each of the three stages has a distinct purpose. Whereas the first stage measures risk 
aversion, as choosing lotteries with lower payoffs can be interpreted as greater risk aversion, 
the second stage measures risk aversion in the presence of ambiguity, while the third 
measures loss aversion. The purpose of this activity is to generate measures of risk behavior 
in order to control for it when analyzing trust, cooperative and risk-sharing behavior.  
The last activity performed in each session was a Risk Pooling Game, based on Barr 
(2003), in which each player chooses whether to form a group to share equally the gains 
from another risk aversion game (as in the first stage of the third activity), or to play the 
same risk aversion game again individually. Once players decide to form the group or not, 
the total number of people forming the group is announced, and then they decide 
individually their lottery choice. This game measures individuals’ willingness to join a 
group and to accept an even distribution of payoffs after again choosing a lottery like those 
available in the first stage of the individual risk games. Again, players are not allowed to   9
communicate and are given only basic information about the composition of the group. The 
most profitable group outcome occurs when all players join the group and choose higher- 
risk lotteries (at a 50 percent chance of the high payment, the expected value should yield 
greater payoffs to everyone in the group, and as the group is larger, the lower the chances of 
getting low payoffs to pool with the group).  
At the end, the coordinator randomly selects one of the four activities to be paid, and 
while one coordinator calculates individual earnings and privately calls upon each 
participant, the remaining coordinators interview each participant, filling out an individual 
survey in order to collect detailed information about socio-economic characteristics and 
attitudes towards group behavior and other sociality preferences. 
The activities of these experimental sessions allow us to obtain proxy measures of 
trust and cooperative attitudes (both towards other individuals and groups);
6 and risk 
attitudes of participating individuals. These measures, paired with their stated pro-social 





As mentioned above, the survey and experiments we use in this paper were taken during the 
first semester of 2007, and the sample consists of more than 3,000 individuals from Bogota, 
Buenos Aires, Caracas, San Jose, Lima and Montevideo. Provided that the aim of this paper 
is to test the link between revealed social actions and stated social behavior, we use our 
individual experimental outcomes as dependent variables and a subjective pro-social index 
of attitudes, described below, as our key variable of interest.
7 Thus, our reduced form 
follows this specification: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 To avoid negative payments players were endowed with a fixed amount regardless gains or losses. At the end the 
expected value of the six lotteries is equivalent to the first stage. 
6 The psychological literature has emphasized the differences between inter-individuals and inter-group trust. 
There is some evidence highlighting behavioral differences between both (discontinuity effects). For that 
reason we explore both independently in this paper. See Insko et al. (1987). 
7 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue that subjective data, such as the pro-social index used here, would 
be less troublesome if used as an independent rather than a dependent variable in a regression setup. If one 
uses subjective data in the left-hand-side, the measurement error tends to become highly correlated with a 
large set of characteristics and behaviors.   10
ic ic ic ic ic ic Y MS Z X Experiment ε β β β β α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1      (1) 
where Experimentic represents the individual outcome of the experiment c for the particular 
individual i. The outcomes used are from three of the experiments: the trust game, the 
voluntary contributions game, and the risk pooling game.
8 In the first game we use two 
outcome variables: the percentage of the initial endowment that player 1 offered to player 2 
and the money that player 2 returned to player 1 at the time of his move (measured as a 
percentage of the money he had at that time: the initial endowment plus the amount received 
from player 1). The choice set of player 2 is, in fact, contingent to the offers made by player 
1, so we estimate equation (1) for each possible move of player 1. In the case of the second 
and third experiments, we use dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the participant made 
a voluntary contribution to his group and if he shares risk with his group, respectively, and 
zero otherwise. 
Additionally, Xic is a vector of individual characteristics that includes age, schooling, 
gender, and socio-economic level. Vector Zic reflects experimental controls, such as a 
measure of risk aversion, calculated from the experiments, and expectations about the 
behavior of the matched player or the group that is playing with the participant. The vector 
MSic contains variables related to the matched player’s or the session characteristics. In the 
trust game, we control by whether the matched player is male and by differences in 
schooling, age, and socio-economic level. For the voluntary contributions model and the 
risk pooling game, we control for session characteristics such as the percentage of women, 
the percentage of participants with less than secondary, the percentage in the lower socio-
economic level, and the number of players. Our variable of interest among the explanatory 
variables is Yic which is an index measuring stated pro-sociality. The index is constructed as 
the percentage of agreement that each individual had with nine pro-social affirmations 
posed to the participants. A high value in the pro-social indicator denotes high pro-sociality. 
Finally, εic is a random error term.  
The exact definitions of all variables used in the regressions and the summary 
statistics are presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 3 presents the statements used 
                                                       
8 The outcomes of the individual risk aversion activity are employed as additional controls.   11
in the construction of our pro-social index.
9 Other characteristics of the sample are that the 
average age is 38, there is a reasonable gender balance in the sample (54 percent are 
women), 50 percent reside in a low socio-economic level neighborhood and 33 percent in a 
medium-level neighborhood, and almost 50 percent of the participants have achieved 
secondary incomplete or less (Cárdenas, Chong and Ñopo, 2008).
10 Tables 4-8 present the 
regression results. All of them include city dummies and have robust standard errors that are 




Table 4 shows the results obtained for the first player’s offer in the trust games, for which 
we use Ordinary Least Squares regressions.
11 The amounts offered by player 1 in this 
experiment may be interpreted as a measure of trust from the individuals towards their 
matched pairs. When using the amounts offered in the trust game as our dependent variable, 
we find a statistically significant link with our pro-social attitude index when not controlling 
for the matched player’s characteristics, as shown in columns 1 and 2. However, when 
including the latter as controls, as shown in column 3, the statistical significance of our 
variable of  interest drops below accepted conventional levels. In relation to the survey 
controls, notice the coefficients of the participant’s schooling, a result that is positive and 
statistically significant at the one percent level in all specifications. Similarly, the 
expectation of generosity of the matched individual (player 2) appears to matter, as it is 
positive statistically significant in all the cases it is included, as found by Rabin (1993). 
Also, whether the first player is a woman has a statistically significant and negative effect 
on the amount offered to player 2. When we include dummies that reflect the possible 
combinations of gender with the matched player it appears that the latter effect becomes 
stronger if player 2 is a man—compared to the case in which player 1 is a man and player 2 
a woman. Participant’s age is statistically significant when we do not include the matched 
player’s characteristics. 
                                                       
9 The pro-social attitudes questions were chosen from Fong (2007) and based on indicators of humanitarian-
egalitarian indices and Katz and Hass (1989). 
10 Appendix 1 presents the correlation coefficients as well as their corresponding statistical significance. 
11 Results do not change when using ordered probit instead.   12
When we use the share of reciprocity of player 2 as the dependent variable for each 
possible response, we find some connection between what people say and what people 
actually do, as in some cases the coefficient of the pro-social index is positive and 
statistically significant for Player 2. This is shown in Table 5. But again, the findings are 
mixed. On one hand, it appears that when the choice set is sufficiently large for Player 2 
(column 5), our pro-social index is linked with more reciprocity. Additionally, age, 
schooling, and socio-economic level matter depending on the size of the offer made by 
Player 1. Furthermore, the percentage expected to be received from Player 1 is also 
statistically significant in all the specifications, so people like to help those who they think 
will help them, and to upset those who they think are hurting them (Rabin, 1993).  
Whereas pro-social attitudes appear not to have robust impact on trust and 
reciprocity at the individual level, such attitudes may instead be reflecting group trust (Insko 
et al., 1987; Song, 2006). In the voluntary contributions game we applied measures such as 
willingness to contribute to a public good. As is well known, in this game the decision to 
contribute to the group increases the benefits for all, but not contributing will always yield 
greater individual payoffs and thus provide an incentive to free ride. Full cooperation yields 
greater payoffs to everyone than if full free-riding occurs, and the gains from cooperation 
increases with the number of players as in the design one player will be indifferent between 
keeping the token and investing it in the group if nine other players had contributed. In fact, 
we find that the coefficient of our pro-sociality index is positive and statistically significant 
at least at the five percent level in all the specifications tested. This is shown in Table 6.
12 
Other controls that are statistically significant at conventional levels are age and risk 
aversion. The older or less risk-prone the participant is, the higher the probability that this 
person is going to make a contribution to the group account.  
Table 7 employs probits in order to show the extent to which our pro-social variable 
explains the individual outcomes of the Risk Pooling game. The purpose of this game is to 
understand the characteristics of the group used by individuals in order to make a decision 
to share risk and join the group. We find that individuals that stated pro-social preferences 
                                                       
12 Appendix 2 shows the marginal effects of our most complete specification (column 3). A one percent 
increment in the pro-social index is linked with an increase in the probability of making a voluntary 
contribution to the group account by about 0.1 percent.   13
are also those that are more interested in risk pooling, as the coefficient of our variable of 
interest is positive and statistically significant at five percent in all cases.
13 As in the 
voluntary contribution experiment, we also find that the age of the participant is positive 
and statistically significant. We also find that the degree of risk aversion is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. The less risk averse the participant, the higher the 
probability that he decides to participate in the risk pooling game. Additionally, it appears 
that gender is important. Without controlling by session characteristics, if the participant is a 
woman has a statistically significant and positive effect. When the session variables are 
added, the latter lose significance and the percentage of women in each session increases the 
probability that the participant shares risk with the rest of the group. Similarly, the higher 
the percentage of people with less than complete secondary education, the lower the 




In order to check the robustness of the results above we use alternative measures of our pro-
social attitude measure. We do this by varying the percentage of pro-social affirmations 
accepted by each participant. In this case, we construct measures based on the agreement of 
the participant with at least 40 percent, 50 percent, and 60 percent of pro-social 
affirmations, out of the nine available for the index.
14 We use the last specification of Tables 
4, 5, 6, and 7, respectively and present our findings with these alternative pro-social 
measures in Table 8.
15 Interestingly, the findings here confirm our previous results.  Pro-
social attitudes appear to have a limited relationship with trust and reciprocity at the 
individual level. On the other hand, pro-social attitudes appear to have a positive and 
statistically significant link with the decision to contribute to a group account or to share the 
risk with it. Furthermore, when we use a higher benchmark of pro-social affirmations, the 
probability of participating in the group account or sharing risk with the rest of the group 
increases. This is shown in both Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. If we use a benchmark of pro-
                                                       
13 Appendix 3 shows marginal effects. An increment of 1 percent in the pro-social index of the participant is 
linked to an increase of about 0.1 percent in risk sharing. 
14 We also tested a principal components method and our results do not change. These results are available 
upon request. 
15 Results do not change when using alternative specifications.   14
social affirmations higher than 40 percent, it seems to have no significant effect. When the 
benchmark is 50 percent, the probability of participating in such a group increases by about 
4.01 percent. Finally, when the benchmark is higher than sixty percent, the corresponding 
probability increase reaches 4.62 percent. Similarly, the corresponding participation in a 
risk pooling game increases monotonically by 5.29 percent, and 6.04 percent, when the pro-




In this paper we report the results of four experiments conducted with representative 
samples of six Latin American cities with the aim of testing the extent to which what 
individuals reveal is consistent with how they act. To do this, we employ simple, well-
known experimental activities and ask individuals to respond questions on pro-social 
preferences and attitudes.  Interestingly, we find that what people say is closer to what they 
do than what is usually expected. This appears to be particularly true in games in which the 
actions of individuals have a bearing on the outcomes of the group, which is the case of the 
public goods and risk pooling games and less so in the case of the trust game.  
The voluntary contributions game and the risk pooling game involve situations in 
which one’s decisions affects several people, around 20 in our case. Therefore, one’s 
decision to cooperate or to join the group for risk-sharing brings a subjective valuation to 
the decision-maker that is mediated by the number of people affected. The greater the pro-
sociality index of the person, the more important it should be to act in a group-oriented 
manner. Players with lower pro-sociality indices should show a lower subjective valuation 
from contributing their token to the group account or from joining the group. This result 
would be consistent with the “warm glow” explanation of charitable behavior by individuals 
(Andreoni, 1990). However, notice that for the case of the risk-pooling game joining the 
group does not necessarily implies increasing the group’s outcome unless more players 
choose riskier lotteries. It could be the case also that joining the group is also associated 
with group membership or ingroup/outgroup phenomena (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) where 
solidarity values reflected in the pro-sociality attitudes produce greater utility for those 
joining the group in the game.   15
  The divergence found between the trust game and both the voluntary contribution 
and risk sharing games may also be due to the fact that the tools employed are context-
dependent, which may have a different influence on the type of game played as it is not 
simple to abstract the responses and experimental outcomes from their frames (Levitt and 
List, 2007).  Admittedly, our findings may be simply reflecting the fact that the questions 
used to construct our pro-social index appear to be better suited to capture the 
corresponding aims of both the public good and the risk sharing game, rather than the trust 
game. But the fact that our findings are consistent with changes in our pro-social variable 
provides an intriguing element in considering the potential usefulness of subjective 
information from representative surveys in econometric work.   16
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Initial offer by Player 1  Percentage of money offered by player 1 to player 2 in the Trust Game. From the 
amount received by player 1, he/she had five options: to give 0%, 25%, 50%, 
75%, or 100% of his/her money to player 2. The variable scale was changed to 0-
1.  
Return offer by Player 2  Is a continuous variable that takes values form 0 to 1 and measure the percentage 
of money that player 2 received, and was returned to player 1. It has on the 
numerator: the “part” of the money that was given by player 1, and that was 
returned by player 2 in the Trust Game. As player 2 receives the triple of the 
amount player 1 decided to give him/her, besides the initial quantity (that is the 
same player 1 received); the return offer could take values from 0% to 400%, 
that is four times the money that player 1 received. On the denominator is a 
measure of the percentage of the amount that was given to player 2 by player 1. 
Also, as player 2 received the triple of the offer plus the same initial quantity 
player 1 received, this variable could take values from 0 to 4 (0% to 400%).  
Second player’s return 
offer if Player 1’s offer is 
0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 
100% 
These are continuous variables that takes values form 0 to 1 and measure the 
percentage of money that player 2 would returned to player 1, depending on the 
amount he/she received from player 1. During the experiment, each player 2 was 
asked the amount of money he/she would return to player 1 in case he/she gave 
him 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 100% of the amount he/she received. Depending on 
each questions there were a set of answers restricted to the amount that could be 
offered by player 1. So, these variables have in the numerator the money that 
could be returned by player 2 in the Trust Game, and in the denominator the 
largest amount that he could received form Player 1, depending on the 
assumption of initial offer made (0%, 25%, …etc.).  The last variable described 
above this one, considers the amount returned by player 2, depending on the 
effective amount offered by player 1.  
Voluntary Contributions 
Model (VCM) 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the player decides to contribute 
to the group in the Voluntary Contributions Game, and 0 otherwise. 
Risk pooling  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the player decides to share the 
risk with the group in the Risk pooling Game, and zero otherwise 
Socio-demographic characteristics  
Age  Age of the participant.  
Gender  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the participant is a female, and 
zero otherwise 
Schooling  Number of years of education of the participant. 
Socio-economic level  Categorical variable that indicates the socio-economic level of the participant: 
low, medium or high. Each category was converted to a dummy variable. In all 
regressions, the first category (low socio-economic level) was the omitted 
dummy. 
City  Categorical variable that indicates the city where was surveyed each participant: 
Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, San Jose y Montevideo. Each category 
was converted into a dummy. In all regressions, “City: Bogota” was the omitted 
dummy. 
Respect to matched players’ characteristics 
Gender compared to the 
matched player 
Categorical variable that takes four values according to the gender of each 
player. The first category correspond to the case in which both players were 
women; the other, in which both were men; the third, in which player 1 was a 
woman and player 2 a man; and the last one, in which player 1 was a man and 
player 2 a woman. Each category was converted into a dummy variable, and the 
omitted category in all the regressions was the dummy where player 1 was a man 
and player 2 a woman. 
Age difference  Difference in age of the matched player with the participant.    20
Variable Definition 
Schooling  difference  Difference in number of years of education of the matched player with the 
participant. 
Socio-economic level 
compared to the matched 
player 
Categorical variable that takes three values depending on the difference between 
the participant and the matched player’s socio-economic levels: if the 
participant’s level was higher, the same or lower than the matched player’s one. 
We convert each category in 3 dummies. In all regressions, the omitted dummy 
was the category in which there was no difference between the matched players. 
Experimental variables 
Risk aversion  Categorical variable that indicates the risk aversion level of the participant: low, 
medium or high. Each category was converted to a dummy variable. In all 
regressions, the first category (low risk aversion) was the omitted dummy.  
Percentage expected from 
matched player 
(For player 2 in Trust 
Games regressions) 
Variable that can take five values: 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%. These values 
reflect the player’s 2 expectation about the percentage -of the initial endowment 
received- that player 1 is going to offer him. 
Percentage expected to be 
returned by matched 
player 
(For player 1 in Trust 
Games regressions) 
This variable can take values from 0% to 100%. It reflects player’s 1 expectation 
of the percentage to be returned by player 2, considering the different set of 
options he has (that set of options depends on the percentage of money gave by 
player 1). 
Percentage of expected 
contributors to VCM 
(VCM regressions) 
This variable result from the division of the number of participants the player 
expects to participate in the group account by the total number of participants in 
each session. It ranges from 0% to 100%. 
Session characteristics 
Percentage of women  Percentage of women in each session. It ranges from 0% to 100%. 
Percentage with less than 
complete secondary 
education 
Percentage of participants in each session that have less than complete secondary 
education. It ranges from 0% to 100%. 
Percentage in the lower  
(or medium) socio-
economic level 
Percentage of participants in each session that reside in the lower (or medium) 
socio-economic level. It ranges from 0% to 100%. 
Number of players per 
session 
Number of participants in each session.  
Pro-social Attitude 
Pro-social index  Index that takes values in the range 0% to 100%, and measure the percentage of 
pro-social affirmations accepted by the participant. For this index were 
considered 9 pro-social affirmations: Agreement with (1) People should worry 
about other people’s well-being, (2) In a good society, people feel responsible for 
others, (3) Rich countries have moral obligation to share wealth with poor 
countries, (4) Public social protection programs help prevent hunger and 
malnutrition, (5) People have the moral obligation to share part of their resources 
with poor people, (6) Taxes must be increased in order to give subsidies to the 
poor, and (7) Taxes must be increased to finance labor insertion programs of 
youth delinquents; and disagreement with: (8) The State’s social protection 
system makes people work less than otherwise, and (9) Poor people don’t make 
an effort to get out of poverty.  
At least, 40%, 50% or 
60% of pro-social 
affirmations accepted 
Dummy variables that take the value of 1 when a participant is in agreement 
with, at least, 40%, 50% or 60% of the 9 pro-social affirmations, and zero 
otherwise. 
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Table 2. 
Basic Data of Experiments 
Obs Std. Dev. Min Max Mean
Socio-demographic characteristics
Average age 3092 15.05 17 80 38 40
Percentage of female population 3096 0.50 0 1 0.54 0.54
Percentage with public education 3096 0.41 0 1 0.79 0.52
Percentage working in the public Sector 1798 0.33 0 1 0.13 0.11
Parental relationship (percentage)
    Household head 3096 0.49 0 1 0.41 0.38
    Wife/Husband 3096 0.43 0 1 0.24 0.24
    Son/Daughter 3096 0.45 0 1 0.27 0.27
    Other 3096 0.26 0 1 0.08 0.11
Marital status (percentage)
    Single 3096 0.48 0 1 0.35 0.33
    Formal or Informal Union 3096 0.50 0 1 0.50 0.55
    Divorced, Widow. 3096 0.36 0 1 0.15 0.13
Educational level (percentage)
   Secondary Incomplete or Less 3096 0.50 0 1 0.45 0.48
   Secondary Complete 3096 0.44 0 1 0.25 0.25
   Tertiary Complete or Incomplete 3096 0.45 0 1 0.29 0.27
Socio-economic level of the neighborhood of residence (percentage)
   Low 3091 0.50 0 1 0.52 -
   Middle 3091 0.46 0 1 0.30 -
   High 3091 0.38 0 1 0.18 -
Related to matched players' characteristics
For first players in Trust Games
Percentage of matched players that are women 1510 0.5 0 1 0.5
Average age difference between matched players 1507 20.5 -54 53 3.1
Average schooling difference between matched players 1510 4.4 -15 14 -1.1
For second players in Trust Games
Percentage of matched players that are women 1551 0.5 0 1 0.6
Average age difference between matched players 1544 19.7 -53 54 0.0
Average schooling difference between matched players 1551 4.4 -14 15 -1.3
Experiment variables
Percentage expected to be returned from player 2 (Trust Game) 1486 23.2 0 100 36.2
Percentage expected to be received from player 1 (Trust game) 1562 29.9 0 100 46.2
Percentage of expected contributors to Voluntary Contribution Game 3080 26.6 0 185 44.5
Risk aversion
Low 3094 0.4 0 1 0.2
Medium 3094 0.5 0 1 0.3
High 3094 0.5 0 1 0.5
Experiment outcomes
First players' average initial offer (percentage) 1517 0.3 0 1 0.4
Second player's return offer if (percentage): 
Effective P1's offer 1539 0.2 0 1 0.3
P1's offer is 0% 1566 0.2 0 1 0.2
P1's offer is 25% 1566 0.2 0 1 0.3
P1's offer is 50% 1565 0.2 0 1 0.3
P1's offer is 75% 1564 0.2 0 1 0.3
P1's offer is 100% 1564 0.2 0 1 0.3
Percentage of participants that contributed to group account 3094 0.4 0 1 0.2
Percentage of participants that shared risk 3096 0.5 0 1 0.5
Session characteristics (not weighted)
Percentage of women 3108 12.4 22.7 90 55.5
Percentage with less than complete secondary education 3109 28.2 0 93.1 31.1
Percentage in the lower socio-economic level 3108 28.2 0 100 39.5
Average size per session 3107 5.5 9 38 22.0
Variables









Social Attitudes in Six Latin American Cities 
(percent) 
 
   Bogota  Buenos 
Aires  Caracas  Lima  Montevideo  San Jose 
Agreement with:                   
People should worry about other people’s well-being  90.71  89.95  86.00  91.56  91.56  92.24 
In a good society, people feel responsible for others  79.61  84.15  74.58  77.01  84.03  78.73 
Rich countries have a moral obligation to share wealth with poor 
countries 
72.31  67.21  69.42  77.24  58.33  69.72 
Public social protection programs help prevent hunger and 
malnutrition 
92.95  77.61  81.12  80.53  76.45  77.65 
People have the moral obligation to share part of their resources 
with poor people 
75.34  65.34  58.17  78.78  57.04  75.54 
Taxes must be increased in order to give subsidies to the poor  52.14  38.23  64.87  62.22  36.51  60.91 
Taxes must be increased to finance labor insertion programs of 
youth delinquents 
47.60  41.53  73.20  69.28  44.88  62.83 
Disagreement with:             
The State social protection system makes people work less than 
otherwise 
64.98  36.18  57.75  55.67  40.43  52.61 
Poor people don’t make an effort to get out of poverty  61.86  66.67  64.03  72.25  58.87  54.80   23
 
Table 4. Amount Offered by Player 1 in the Trust Games and Pro-Social Attitude 
 
  Dependent variable: First player's initial offer 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
-0.0355** -0.0344**    Gender: Female 
(0.0153) (0.0142)   
0.0014*** 0.0010**  0.0005  Age 
(0.0005) (0.0005)  (0.0007) 
0.0075*** 0.0083***  0.0101***  Years of education 
(0.0026) (0.0025)  (0.0032) 
0.0204 0.0102 -0.0016  Socio-economic level: medium 
(0.0185) (0.0171)  (0.0204) 
0.0156 0.0192  0.0026  Socio-economic level: high 
(0.0191) (0.0186)  (0.0231) 
Experimental variables 
 0.0032***  0.0032***  Percentage expected to be returned by matched 
player   (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
 0.0325  0.0329  Risk aversion: medium 
 (0.0250)  (0.0256) 
 -0.0100  -0.0101  Risk aversion: high 
 (0.0233)  (0.0239) 
Respect to matched player’s characteristics 
   -0.0307  If both players are men 
   (0.0214) 
   -0.0331*  If both players are women 
   (0.0182) 
   -0.0643***  If participant is a woman and the match is a man 
   (0.0194) 
   0.0006  Age difference 
   (0.0005) 
   -0.0018  Schooling difference 
   (0.0023) 
   -0.0207  If participant is at a lower socio-economic level 
   (0.0186) 
   0.0168  If participant is at a higher socio-economic level 
   (0.0206) 
Pro-social attitude 
0.0006* 0.0006*  0.0005  Pro-social index 
(0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
0.1923*** 0.0916*  0.1140*  Constant 
(0.0519) (0.0530)  (0.0602) 
Observations 1516  1483  1466 
R-squared 0.04  0.11  0.12 
F 
1/ 4.581  9.886  7.787 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of clusters  150  150  149 
1/For each regression: (1) F(11,49); (2) F(14,149); (3) F(20,148). 2/ Robust standard errors, clustered by 
session, in parentheses. All regressions are run using OLS and include dummies per city. Including 
dummies per session gives similar results. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** 
significant at one percent. 
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Table 5. Amount Returned by Player 2 in Trust Game and Pro-Social Attitude 
 
 
  Dependent variables: Second player’s return offer if… 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
 











0.0026*** 0.0012**  0.0011**  0.0003  0.0001  Age 
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
-0.0065** -0.0003  0.0024  0.0041*  0.0051**  Years of education 
(0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022)  (0.0024) 
0.0101 0.0193  0.0362***  0.0348***  0.0366***  Socio-economic level: medium 
(0.0173) (0.0133) (0.0125) (0.0110)  (0.0131) 
0.0085 0.0164  0.0355**  0.0318**  0.0397**  Socio-economic level: high 
(0.0246) (0.0190) (0.0158) (0.0147)  (0.0167) 
Experimental variables 
0.0026*** 0.0024*** 0.0021*** 0.0021***  0.0023***  Percentage expected to be 
received from matched player  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
In regard to matched player’s characteristics 
-0.0081 -0.0039 -0.0011 -0.0157  -0.0139  If both players are men 
(0.0195) (0.0165) (0.0161) (0.0155)  (0.0168) 
-0.0087 -0.0105  -0.0300**  -0.0346**  -0.0349***  If both players are women 
(0.0167) (0.0139) (0.0135) (0.0135)  (0.0132) 
-0.0011 -0.0130  -0.0242* 
-
0.0418*** -0.0287* 
If participant is a woman and 
the match is a man 
(0.0165) (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0135)  (0.0150) 
-0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001  0.0000  Age difference 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
-0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0006  -0.0012  Schooling difference 
(0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016)  (0.0018) 
0.0085 0.0106 0.0114 0.0159  0.0081  If participant is at a lower 
socio-economic level  (0.0182) (0.0148) (0.0136) (0.0136)  (0.0146) 
-0.0074 -0.0067 -0.0101 0.0027  0.0061  If participant is at a higher 
socio-economic level  (0.0171) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0124)  (0.0142) 
Pro-social attitude 
0.0004 0.0005* 0.0003  0.0004  0.0005*  Pro-social index 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0003) 
-0.0125 0.0121 0.0129 0.0245  0.0054  Constant 
(0.0531) (0.0406) (0.0386) (0.0381)  (0.0411) 
Observations 1533  1534  1533  1533  1533 
R-squared 0.19  0.18  0.17  0.17  0.17 
F( 18,   148)   15.51  13.71  14.61  14.63  14.95 
Prob > F  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of clusters  149  149  149  149  149 
Robust standard errors, clustered by session, in parentheses. All regressions are run using OLS and 
include dummies per city. Including dummies per session gives similar results. * Significant at ten 
percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at one percent. 
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Table 6. Voluntary Contributions and Pro-Social Attitude 
 
  Dependent variable: Voluntary contribution to the group account 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
0.0172 0.0306 0.0195  Gender: Female 
(0.0555) (0.0577) (0.0583) 
0.0122*** 0.0077*** 0.0077***  Age 
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
-0.0013 0.0076 -0.0006  Years of education 
(0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0104) 
0.0251 0.0797 0.0572  Socio-economic level: medium 
(0.0668) (0.0664) (0.0726) 
0.0792 0.1350 0.0321  Socio-economic level: high 
(0.0842) (0.0893) (0.0912) 
Experimental variables 
 0.0223***  0.0224***  Percentage of expected contributors 
to VCM   (0.0014)  (0.0014) 
 0.1603  0.1693*  Risk aversion: medium 
 (0.0996)  (0.0988) 
 0.1876**  0.1936**  Risk aversion: high 
 (0.0863)  (0.0855) 
Session characteristics 
   0.0023  Percentage of women 
   (0.0026) 
   -0.0023  Percentage with less than complete 
secondary education     (0.0021) 
   -0.0029  Percentage in the lower socio-
economic level     (0.0018) 
   -0.2444  Percentage in the medium socio-
economic level     (0.1913) 
   0.0043  Number of players 
   (0.0063) 
Pro-social attitude 
0.0037*** 0.0032**  0.0033**  Pro-social index 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
-1.9032*** -3.0920*** -2.9162***  Constant 
(0.1874) (0.2321) (0.3277) 
Observations  3086 3070 3070 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0538  0.180  0.183 
Chi
2 1/  133.6 350.5 348.9 
Prob > chi
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number  of  clusters  150 150 150 
1/ For each regression: (1) chi2 (11); (2) chi2 (14); (3) chi2 (19). 2/ Robust standard errors, clustered by 
session, in parentheses. All regressions are run using probit and include dummies per city. Including dummies 
per session gives similar results. * Significant at ten percent; ** significant at five percent; *** significant at 
one percent. 
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Table 7. Risk Pooling and Pro-Social Attitude 
 
  Dependent variable: Sharing risk with a group 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
0.0897* 0.0849*  0.0620  Gender: Female 
(0.0486) (0.0482) (0.0481) 
0.0110*** 0.0111*** 0.0113***  Age 
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
0.0149 0.0140 0.0042  Years of education 
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0105) 
-0.0178 -0.0090 -0.0237  Socio-economic level: medium 
(0.0703) (0.0701) (0.0728) 
-0.0358 -0.0261 -0.0869  Socio-economic level: high 
(0.0830) (0.0831) (0.0919) 
Experimental variables 
 0.1756**  0.1805**  Risk aversion: medium 
 (0.0726)  (0.0727) 
 0.1189*  0.1266*  Risk aversion: high 
 (0.0696)  (0.0691) 
Session characteristics 
   0.0042*  Percentage of women 
   (0.0025) 
   -0.0035*  Percentage with less than complete 
secondary education     (0.0018) 
   -0.0011  Percentage in the lower socio-economic 
level     (0.0017) 
   -0.1607  Percentage in the medium socio-
economic level     (0.1740) 
   -0.0086  Number of players 
   (0.0057) 
Pro-social attitude 
0.0031** 0.0031** 0.0032**  Pro-social index 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
-1.0965*** -1.2147*** -0.9318***  Constant 
(0.1872) (0.2022) (0.2921) 
Observations  3088 3086 3086 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.0298 0.0312 0.0355 
Chi
2 1/  109.2 117.7 130.3 
Prob > chi
2  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number  of  clusters  150 150 150 
1/ For each regression: (1) chi2 (11); (2) chi2 (13); (3) chi2 (18). 2/ Robust standard errors, 
clustered by session, in parentheses. All regressions are run using probit and include 
dummies per city. Including dummies per session gives similar results. * Significant at 10 
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  
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Table 8. Robustness to Changes in Pro-Social Index 
 
 
First player's initial offer 
Second player's return offer 
conditioned to effective P1's 
offer 
Voluntary contribution to the 
group account  Sharing risk with a group 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
-0.0183        0.0141        0.0813        0.0791        Pro-social index is 
higher than 40%  (0.0204)     (0.0179)     (0.0893)      (0.0793)     
  -0.0024      0.0197     0.1518**     0.1332**    Pro-social index is 
higher than 50%    (0.0167)    (0.0129)    (0.0639)     (0.0561)   
   0.0191    0.0143     0.1721***      0.1520***  Pro-social index is 
higher than 60%     (0.0141)    (0.0108)     (0.0561)      (0.0515) 
Observations  1466  1466 1466 1523 1523 1523 3070 3070  3070  3086 3086  3086 
R-squared / Pseudo R-
squared 
1/  0.11  0.11 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.17  0.181  0.183 0.184  0.0340  0.0351  0.0360 
F / Chi2 
2/  8.242  7.763 7.886 15.18 15.28 15.33 350.8 357.9  350.5  122.6 125.0  134.4 
F > 0, Chi2 > 0 
2/  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 
Number  of  clusters  149  149 149 149 149 149 150 150  150  150 150  150 
1/ For (1) to (6), R- squared as they are OLS regressions; for (7) to (12), Pseudo R-squared, as they are probit regressions. 2/For columns (1) to (3): F(20,148); for (4) to (6): 
F(18,148); for (7) to (9): chi2(19); and for (10) to (12): chi2(18). 2/ Robust standard errors, clustered by session, in parentheses. All regressions include dummies per city. 
Regressions (1) to (3), (7) to (9), and (10) to (12) are run using specifications from the third column of Tables 3, 5, and 6, respectively. Specification use for regressions (4) 
to (6) correspond to the first column of Table 4. Including dummies per session gives similar results. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant 
at 1 percent.   28
Appendix 1. Correlation Matrices 
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0.0217 0.8167 0.4560 0.7233
0.398 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0627 0.0362 0.0493 0.0407 0.0122
0.015 0.158 0.054 0.112 0.635
-0.0642 -0.0184 -0.0165 -0.0155 0.0071 0.1393
0.012 0.471 0.519 0.545 0.782 0.000
0.1006 -0.1225 -0.0499 -0.0636 -0.0725 -0.1484 -0.0470
0.000 0.000 0.051 0.013 0.005 0.000 0.066
0.0356 -0.0377 0.0045 -0.0206 -0.0156 0.0242 0.0064 0.1023
0.165 0.141 0.860 0.422 0.542 0.345 0.801 0.000
0.0464 -0.0516 -0.0431 -0.0621 -0.0386 -0.0018 -0.0248 0.3404 -0.4307
0.070 0.044 0.092 0.015 0.131 0.943 0.331 0.000 0.000
0.2574 0.0289 0.0164 0.0121 0.0117 0.0670 -0.0454 0.0167 0.0434 0.0097
0.000 0.266 0.528 0.642 0.651 0.010 0.080 0.519 0.094 0.709
0.0621 0.0227 0.0412 0.0364 0.0182 0.0170 0.0224 0.0378 -0.0445 0.0005 0.0062
0.016 0.375 0.108 0.155 0.478 0.508 0.381 0.140 0.082 0.984 0.812
-0.0738 -0.0370 -0.0460 -0.0371 -0.0360 -0.0433 0.0332 -0.0137 0.0281 -0.0255 -0.0265 -0.7148
0.004 0.148 0.072 0.148 0.160 0.090 0.195 0.594 0.272 0.319 0.306 0.000
0.0136 -0.0309 -0.0280 -0.0184 -0.0274 -0.0608 -0.5650 0.0655 -0.0482 0.0459 0.0380 -0.0198 -0.0069
0.599 0.229 0.277 0.476 0.288 0.018 0.000 0.011 0.061 0.074 0.144 0.441 0.788
0.0003 -0.0055 0.0090 -0.0154 -0.0176 0.0495 0.5978 -0.0297 0.0333 -0.0233 -0.0025 -0.0027 0.0472 -0.3378
0.989 0.830 0.727 0.549 0.493 0.054 0.000 0.248 0.195 0.365 0.922 0.918 0.067 0.000
-0.0733 -0.0175 -0.0293 -0.0023 0.0241 0.1079 0.5081 -0.0275 -0.0311 -0.0036 -0.0461 0.0255 -0.0086 -0.2871 -0.3867
0.004 0.497 0.256 0.930 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.285 0.226 0.887 0.076 0.321 0.737 0.000 0.000
0.0597 0.0148 0.0455 0.0538 0.0178 0.6631 0.0599 -0.0922 -0.0172 -0.0229 0.0415 0.0365 -0.0518 0.0239 -0.0478 0.1203
0.021 0.566 0.078 0.037 0.489 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.505 0.373 0.111 0.157 0.044 0.354 0.063 0.000
0.0486 -0.0446 -0.0166 -0.0283 -0.0161 -0.1249 -0.0133 0.5859 0.1092 0.1314 -0.0404 0.0323 -0.0142 0.0142 0.0514 -0.0705 -0.1784
0.059 0.083 0.520 0.272 0.533 0.000 0.605 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.210 0.582 0.580 0.046 0.006 0.000
-0.0324 0.0234 0.0086 0.0290 0.0130 0.0187 0.0070 -0.0688 -0.0586 -0.3171 0.0264 -0.0241 0.0320 0.0066 -0.0084 0.0171 0.0100 -0.2206
0.209 0.364 0.738 0.261 0.615 0.468 0.785 0.007 0.023 0.000 0.310 0.350 0.214 0.798 0.745 0.507 0.698 0.000
0.0351 -0.0593 -0.0319 -0.0700 -0.0413 -0.0488 0.0362 0.2142 0.1557 0.3364 -0.0130 -0.0039 -0.0010 -0.0277 0.0557 -0.0182 -0.0389 0.2689
0.173 0.021 0.216 0.007 0.109 0.058 0.160 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.619 0.879 0.969 0.282 0.030 0.480 0.131 0.000
Schooling difference
If participant is at a lower socio-
economic level
If participant is at a higher socio-
economic level
If both players are men
If both players are women
Age difference
If participant is a woman an the 
matched is a man
Socio-economic level: high









Pro-social index is higher than 40%
Pro-social index is higher than 50%
Pro-social index is higher than 60%
 
P-values are reported below the correlation coefficients.  
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Panel B. Amount Returned by Player 2 in Trust Game 
 
P1's offer: P1's offer: P1's offer: P1's offer: P1's offer:
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
P1's offer: 0% 0.5744
0.000
P1's offer: 25% 0.7940 0.6122
0.000 0.000
P1's offer: 50% 0.7996 0.5020 0.7657
0.000 0.000 0.000
P1's offer: 75% 0.7401 0.4254 0.7053 0.8162
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P1's offer: 100% 0.7275 0.3878 0.6567 0.7953 0.8268
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0321 0.0568 0.0464 0.0273 0.0166 0.0205
0.208 0.025 0.066 0.281 0.513 0.417
0.0188 0.0375 0.0252 0.0322 0.0219 0.0153 0.6333
0.462 0.138 0.319 0.203 0.386 0.546 0.000
0.0323 0.0511 0.0452 0.0329 0.0185 0.0170 0.7599 0.6316
0.205 0.043 0.074 0.194 0.464 0.502 0.000 0.000
0.0302 0.0471 0.0510 0.0333 0.0187 0.0158 0.8203 0.4439 0.7028
0.236 0.062 0.044 0.188 0.461 0.534 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.0912 0.1652 0.1172 0.0945 0.0343 0.0382 0.0951 0.0312 0.0702 0.0887
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.175 0.131 0.000 0.218 0.006 0.000
-0.0048 0.0294 -0.0110 -0.0561 -0.0795 -0.0653 -0.0415 -0.0412 -0.0121 -0.0125 0.1148
0.850 0.244 0.665 0.026 0.002 0.010 0.101 0.103 0.633 0.621 0.000
0.0223 -0.1422 -0.0254 0.0562 0.1193 0.1331 -0.0705 -0.0227 -0.0789 -0.0851 -0.1402 -0.0821
0.382 0.000 0.315 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.370 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001
0.0211 -0.0103 0.0006 0.0272 0.0321 0.0285 -0.0707 -0.0751 -0.0405 -0.0268 0.0073 0.0110 0.0712
0.407 0.685 0.981 0.281 0.205 0.261 0.005 0.003 0.109 0.289 0.773 0.664 0.005
0.0369 -0.0336 0.0063 0.0546 0.0631 0.0868 0.0023 0.0243 -0.0058 -0.0159 0.0387 -0.0375 0.3386 -0.4285
0.147 0.184 0.804 0.031 0.013 0.001 0.929 0.337 0.820 0.529 0.126 0.138 0.000 0.000
0.3481 0.3227 0.3504 0.3322 0.3195 0.3148 0.0243 0.0294 0.0328 0.0273 0.1209 0.0001 -0.0363 -0.0553 0.0307
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.337 0.245 0.195 0.280 0.000 0.998 0.151 0.029 0.226
-0.0030 -0.0272 0.0047 0.0366 0.0319 0.0301 0.0390 0.0209 0.0310 0.0231 -0.0899 -0.5508 0.0551 -0.0477 0.0587 -0.0094
0.908 0.284 0.853 0.150 0.209 0.236 0.124 0.412 0.223 0.364 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.060 0.021 0.712
0.0037 0.0225 0.0028 -0.0389 -0.0363 -0.0517 -0.0460 -0.0414 -0.0333 -0.0303 0.1064 0.6024 -0.0813 -0.0130 -0.0397 0.0291 -0.3318
0.883 0.375 0.912 0.125 0.153 0.042 0.070 0.103 0.191 0.233 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.609 0.118 0.253 0.000
-0.0098 0.0063 -0.0211 -0.0272 -0.0592 -0.0268 -0.0011 -0.0054 0.0224 0.0191 0.0135 0.5109 -0.0103 0.0341 -0.0006 -0.0328 -0.2814 -0.3783
0.702 0.804 0.406 0.284 0.020 0.291 0.966 0.832 0.378 0.451 0.594 0.000 0.684 0.179 0.982 0.196 0.000 0.000
0.0540 0.1222 0.0846 0.0545 0.0059 0.0172 0.0864 0.0417 0.0643 0.0821 0.6612 0.1173 -0.1022 0.0068 -0.0119 0.0759 -0.0160 0.0482 0.0841
0.034 0.000 0.001 0.032 0.816 0.499 0.001 0.101 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.788 0.640 0.003 0.530 0.058 0.001
-0.0285 -0.1190 -0.0623 -0.0336 0.0309 0.0305 0.0005 0.0204 -0.0149 -0.0196 -0.1030 -0.0467 0.5502 0.0033 0.1342 -0.0423 -0.0094 -0.0444 -0.0064
0.264 0.000 0.014 0.185 0.224 0.230 0.985 0.421 0.558 0.440 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.898 0.000 0.096 0.713 0.080 0.801
0.0416 0.0594 0.0465 0.0304 0.0263 0.0068 -0.0122 -0.0162 0.0000 0.0085 0.0156 0.0418 -0.0911 -0.0210 -0.3282 0.0647 -0.0291 0.0621 -0.0184
0.103 0.019 0.067 0.231 0.301 0.790 0.632 0.524 1.000 0.737 0.540 0.100 0.000 0.408 0.000 0.011 0.252 0.015 0.469
0.0185 -0.0441 -0.0149 0.0123 0.0484 0.0667 -0.0584 -0.0310 -0.0484 -0.0412 -0.0044 -0.0263 0.1974 0.1165 0.3645 -0.0180 0.0136 -0.0173 -0.0119
0.470 0.082 0.558 0.629 0.057 0.009 0.022 0.224 0.057 0.105 0.863 0.301 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.479 0.592 0.497 0.639
Schooling difference
If participant is at a lower 
socio-economic level









































If participant is 
a woman an the 
































Second player's return offer if:
Effective 
P1's offer
Pro-social index is higher 
than 40%
Pro-social index is higher 
than 50%




If both players are men
If both players are women
If participant is a woman an 
the matched is a man
Age difference
Socio-economic level: high
Percentage expected to be 





P-values are reported below the correlation coefficients.  
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index is higher 
than 40%
Pro-social 
index is higher 
than 50%
Pro-social 




























0.0377 0.0302 0.7617 0.6311
0.036 0.093 0.000 0.000
0.0509 0.0395 0.8183 0.4499 0.7129
0.005 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.1160 0.1321 0.0653 0.0400 0.0552 0.0507
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.002 0.005
0.0173 0.0477 -0.0310 -0.0291 -0.0140 -0.0030 0.1276
0.335 0.008 0.085 0.105 0.437 0.866 0.000
0.0020 0.0105 -0.0966 -0.0364 -0.0714 -0.0790 -0.1437 -0.0641
0.913 0.560 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.0099 0.0058 -0.0550 -0.0357 -0.0308 -0.0215 0.0161 0.0090 0.0870
0.583 0.746 0.002 0.047 0.087 0.233 0.370 0.615 0.000
0.0199 0.0046 -0.0242 -0.0091 -0.0337 -0.0272 0.0188 -0.0310 0.3396 -0.4294
0.267 0.798 0.179 0.612 0.061 0.130 0.297 0.084 0.000 0.000
0.3831 0.1886 0.0519 0.0329 0.0445 0.0470 0.1598 0.0030 -0.0865 -0.0421 -0.0375
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.068 0.014 0.009 0.000 0.867 0.000 0.019 0.037
0.0161 0.0314 0.0298 0.0398 0.0411 0.0330 0.0333 0.0012 -0.0120 -0.0521 -0.0111 0.0408
0.370 0.080 0.097 0.027 0.022 0.066 0.064 0.945 0.503 0.004 0.537 0.023
-0.0132 -0.0055 -0.0361 -0.0411 -0.0296 -0.0316 -0.0727 0.0359 0.0319 0.0368 -0.0110 -0.0857 -0.6965
0.463 0.760 0.045 0.022 0.100 0.079 0.000 0.046 0.076 0.041 0.540 0.000 0.000
0.0243 0.0485 0.0270 0.0253 0.0164 0.0175 0.0544 0.2501 -0.1598 0.0166 -0.1021 0.0474 0.0132 -0.0141
0.177 0.007 0.133 0.159 0.361 0.330 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.356 0.000 0.008 0.463 0.433
-0.0495 -0.0163 0.0503 0.0242 0.0396 0.0289 0.1518 0.0500 -0.5607 -0.0267 -0.1903 0.0112 -0.0026 0.0131 0.2000
0.006 0.363 0.005 0.178 0.027 0.107 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.534 0.887 0.467 0.000
-0.0274 -0.0355 0.0378 0.0278 0.0240 0.0169 -0.0390 0.0324 -0.3397 -0.2338 -0.3920 0.0531 0.0432 -0.0103 0.1294
0.127 0.048 0.036 0.122 0.183 0.347 0.030 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.565 0.000
-0.0104 0.0075 -0.0220 -0.0137 0.0069 -0.0004 0.0226 0.0086 0.0425 0.4895 -0.2255 -0.0115 -0.0301 0.0079 0.0345
0.563 0.676 0.220 0.445 0.703 0.984 0.207 0.630 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.525 0.094 0.658 0.054
-0.0145 -0.0375 0.0322 0.0178 0.0134 0.0328 0.0148 0.0275 -0.1658 -0.0203 -0.0672 -0.0202 -0.0278 0.0429 0.1066
0.419 0.037 0.073 0.323 0.455 0.068 0.409 0.126 0.000 0.258 0.000 0.262 0.122 0.017 0.000
Number of players




Percentage with less than 
complete secondary education




Percentage of expected 
contributors to VCM
Risk aversion: medium







Pro-social index is higher than 
40%
Pro-social index is higher than 
50%
 
P-values are reported below the correlation coefficients.  
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Appendix 2  
Marginal Effects: Voluntary Contributions and Pro-Social Attitude 
 
  Dependent variable: Voluntary contribution to the group account 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Socio-demographic characteristics  
0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0021***  Age 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
0.0053 0.0038 0.0042 0.0049  Gender: Female 
(0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0159) 
-0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0000  Years of education 
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
0.0158 0.0133 0.0150 0.0144  Socio-economic level: medium 
(0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
0.0089 0.0071 0.0088 0.0089  Socio-economic level: high 
(0.0254) (0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0255) 
Experimental variables 
0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061***  Percentage of expected 
contributors to VCM  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
0.0478* 0.0479*  0.0467  0.0466  Risk aversion: medium 
(0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0285) 
0.0529** 0.0529** 0.0524** 0.0521**  Risk aversion: high 
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0233) 
Session characteristics 
0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006  Percentage of women 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
-0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006  Percentage with less than 
complete secondary education  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
-0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008  Percentage in the lower socio-
economic level  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
-0.0671 -0.0707 -0.0705 -0.0661  Percentage in the medium socio-
economic level  (0.0527) (0.0530) (0.0527) (0.0524) 
0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011  Number of players 
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Pro-social attitude 
0.0009**           Pro-social index 
(0.0004)      
 0.0217     Pro-social index is higher than 
40%   (0.0232)    
   0.0401**    Pro-social index is higher than 
50%     (0.0163)   
    0.0462***  Pro-social index is higher than 
60%      (0.0148) 
Observations  3070 3070 3070 3070 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.183 0.181 0.183 0.184 
Number  of  clusters  150 150 150 150 
This table presents the marginal effects of the third regression of Table 5, and regressions (7), (8), and (9) 
from Table 7. Robust standard errors, clustered by session, in parentheses. All regressions are run using 
probit and include dummies per city. Including dummies per session gives similar results. * Significant at 
10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.    32
Appendix 3 
Marginal Effects: Risk Pooling and Pro-Social Attitude 
 
  Dependent variable: Sharing risk with a group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Socio-demographic characteristics 
0.0045*** 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0045***  Age 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
0.0247 0.0229 0.0234 0.0232  Gender: Female 
(0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0192) 
0.0017 0.0013 0.0015 0.0017  Years of education 
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
-0.0095 -0.0124 -0.0105 -0.0112  Socio-economic level: medium 
(0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
-0.0346 -0.0366 -0.0347 -0.0351  Socio-economic level: high 
(0.0365) (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0364) 
Experimental variables 
0.0719** 0.0722** 0.0708** 0.0708**  Risk aversion: medium 
(0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0289) 
0.0504* 0.0505* 0.0496* 0.0499*  Risk aversion: high 
(0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0274) (0.0275) 
Session characteristics 
0.0017* 0.0017* 0.0017* 0.0017*  Percentage of women 
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
-0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0014*  Percentage with less than 
complete secondary education  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
-0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004  Percentage in the lower socio-
economic level  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
-0.0640 -0.0673 -0.0675 -0.0647  Percentage in the medium socio-
economic level  (0.0693) (0.0694) (0.0691) (0.0691) 
-0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0034  Number of players 
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Pro-social attitude 
0.0013**       Pro-social index 
(0.0005)      
 0.0314     Pro-social index is higher than 
40%   (0.0314)    
   0.0529**    Pro-social index is higher than 
50%     (0.0222)   
    0.0604***  Pro-social index is higher than 
60%      (0.0204) 
Observations  3086 3086 3086 3086 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.0355 0.0340 0.0351 0.0360 
Number  of  clusters  150 150 150 150 
This table presents the marginal effects of the third regression of Table 6, and regressions (10), (11), and (12) 
from Table 7. Robust standard errors, clustered by session, in parentheses. All regressions are run using probit 
and include dummies per city. Including dummies per session gives similar results. * Significant at 10 percent; 
** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  
 